Trivia

[pedja]

Dobro, nema veze sa automobilima, ali je korisno

Da, promasio sam

[dragvorl]

Ja sam bas u dva navrata kupovao svez skoro, otpadne tacno oko pola mase dok se ne oljusti. Ali je mnogo bolji nego u konzervi.

[Geza]

Lancia nije proizvodila samo automobile. Nekada su u programu bili kamioni, autobusi, trolejbusi, kombi...

[ivica122]

I Peugeot ne proizvodi samo automobile, najveći je svetski proizvođač mlinova za kafu i tu imaju mnogo dužu tradiciju.

[methane.master]

Rade i bajseve.

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[shandu90]

Radili su oni sve i svasta, i bili su vrlo ozbiljni u svim pricama. Automobili im bas nesto ne idu u poslednje vreme al sta sad. Cak su i na TG pravili kraci istorijat.

Sent from my LG-H440n

[pedja]

Video sam u jednom hotelu Peugeot mlin za biber - odlican.

[dragvorl]

I Alfa je imala svoju masinu.

[Geza]

[Kuzmanovic]

Alfina prepoznatljiva prednja maska.

Sent from my SM-G900F using Tapatalk

[Geza]

Malo o vezama Renault-Volvo i neuspešnom integrisanju kompanija.

Why Volvo Kissed Renault Goodbye
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ ... lt-goodbye
December 20, 1993 — 12:00 AM EST

It took Volvo Chairman Pehr G. Gyllenhammar and Renault Director General Louis Schweitzer three years to perfect a plan merging the two auto companies into a $40 billion juggernaut. It took less than three months for their dream deal to collapse.

Yet the aftershocks of that deal will be felt for months, if not years. Mutual recriminations have torn apart Sweden's closely knit business community. Worse, the details of this juicy tale suggest how fiendishly hard it is to effect a merger between two of Europe's nameplate companies. That's disheartening news for Europeans who think such combines are crucial for the continent's competitiveness. "This has been an object lesson for Europe," says DRI/McGraw-Hill analyst John K. Lawson. "Anybody considering a trans-European merger should think long and hard about whose national pride and economic interests could be hurt."

What a contrast from the exuberance of Sept. 6, the day Gyllenhammar and Schweitzer triumphantly announced a plan that, publicly at least, seemed a model for the new, borderless Europe. Yet Lars-Erik Forsgardh, managing director of the Swedish Shareholders Assn., always had his doubts. He had clashed often with Gyllenhammar, an authoritarian manager who for 22 years had devised many ambitious, but not always profitable, schemes for Volvo. Forsgardh's group, which represents individuals who together hold only 10% of Volvo stock, had scored several victories in these skirmishes, yet Gyllenhammar kept his grip on Volvo. This time, though, Forsgardh's protests were to be Gyllenhammar's undoing.

FINAL STRAW. It started on Oct. 6, when Forsgardh registered a lone note of dissent against the merger. His group believed Gyllenhammar's plan would depress Volvo shares. The most egregious part of the deal was the so-called golden share, which would have let the French government limit the voting rights of any shareholder, Volvo included, to 20%. The group also claimed Volvo failed to document the need for a merger over an existing strategic alliance with Renault. The final straw was the lack of any guarantee that Renault would be privatized, because only then could Volvo shareholders realize any gains. "From a shareholder's point of view, I couldn't think of a worse arrangement," says Forsgardh.

Forsgardh didn't know then that many Volvo managers secretly agreed with him, especially since Volvo's existing alliance with Renault wasn't going nearly as smoothly as Volvo and Renault wanted the world to believe. Some Volvo managers, reluctant to speak internally, started leaking confidential information in the hope of destroying the merger. Gradually Forsgardh and other institutional investors began to hear from midlevel Volvo executives about numerous points of friction, especially in research and development. In the truck division, "it was an impenetrable mess," says one source. "We gave the French all our ideas, all our plans, and we got nothing in return."

Things were just as serious on the car side, where engineers have been working on a common platform that both Volvo and Renault will use for their next-generation executive car. A source says the two sides couldn't even agree on which way the engine would face: Renault designers would speak French to one another when they wanted to shut out Volvo workers, around whom they normally spoke English. Renault says the alliance has had "a lot of results. For these results, some people had to have worked well together." A Volvo spokesman admits there were problems but wouldn't elaborate further.

Opposition began to snowball when word spread that three former top officials were against the deal, including H akan Frisinger, Volvo's CEO from 1983 to 1987. Says one Volvo investment adviser: "We didn't realize Mr. Gyllenhammar had so many personal enemies."

Just as investors were beginning to feel railroaded, Volvo issued a second prospectus in which projected savings from the merger rose from $4.8 billion to $7.4 billion. But Volvo never said where the extra savings would come from. "The savings figure was counterproductive. There was no new information on which to base it, except the need to make the deal look better," says a source close to the company. The company also claimed that Renault and Volvo together would achieve margins of 7% even though neither one has had margins that high in the past five years.

Despite the opposition, Gyllenhammar and Schweitzer still expected victory. To clinch the deal, the French government promised to privatize Renault within a year and not abuse its voting power to blunt Volvo's influence. It also flew major Volvo shareholders to Paris on Nov. 24 to meet with Schweitzer and hear success stories about the alliance.

But when shareholders returned home, the local press carried leaks from Volvo managers on problems with the alliance. Investors felt misled. Says one: "If top managers have doubts about a big merger, then it won't work. We felt it would fail before it got started." Investors went to Volvo Chief Executive Soren Gyll, asking him to withdraw the proposal when the board met on Dec. 7.

MUTINY? One of the final blows came on Nov. 30, when an unnamed Volvo official leaked a monthly profit report that showed Volvo's earnings jumping sharply. By contrast, Renault's earnings nose-dived. With Gyllenhammar in the U.S., Gyll polled 25 senior car and truck division managers at a hastily called meeting at his home. All but a handful told him the merger wouldn't work. The next day Gyll informed Gyllenhammar, who canceled the deal and resigned.

In an emotional Dec. 6 letter to the Gothenburg Post, Gyllenhammar's wife, Christina, whose father was once Volvo chairman, accused Gyll of betraying her husband to further his own personal ambitions. "Your `yes' has always been a `no,"' she wrote. Gyll strongly denies that he led any such mutiny.

While Swedes take sides in this bitter debate, Volvo's future remains uncertain. Both Volvo and Renault have said they will need capital injections totaling $2 billion if the merger isn't consummated. Analysts say Volvo is likely to raise cash by selling off assets unrelated to cars and trucks, dismantling Gyllenhammar's 10-year-old diversification strategy. The question now is whether Volvo will try to salvage the Renault alliance. A bigger question is whether Volvo's experience will be repeated every time Europe's corporate giants try to merge. It is a bitter lesson for every European manager to ponder.


I još jedan dobar tekst.
http://faculty.darden.virginia.edu/brun ... 0Volvo.pdf

[Geza]

W12 motor koji je razvijan mnogo pre Volkswagenovog. Nažalost nije se našao u ponudi.

[nidza]

Kako je izgledalo aktivno vešanje na Williams bolidu iz 1993. godine. Zabranjeno je od 1994. godine, koja se zatim pokazala kao užasno tragična.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_cont ... AME4v3qZkc

[HKS]

Zasto je zabranjeno? Zasto nisu svi uveli to, Williams ima patent ili?

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[nidza]

Svi su imali pravo na aktivno vešanje, ali stvarno su ga kvalitetno implementirali samo najbogatiji timovi. Nije mi poznato da je Williams imao neku ekskluzivu nad tim, sem da ga je verovatno najuspešnije implementirao.

Izbacili su ga, kao i mnoge druge pomoći kasnije, kako bi se što više vožnja svela na vozača, a manje na računar. Ne pomaže to mnogo, u većini sezona dominira neki tim posle svake promene pravila, jer je ovo visoko tehnološki sport, nije samo vozački, nego i timski, inžinjerski. Biju se tu bitke na mnogo dimenzija i uvek neko ispliva u prvi plan.