Pretpostavljam da na prvo citanje ovoga sto je postovao @Heinz ne obracate paznju na ovo:
Maintenance practices problem. The previous crew had experienced the same problem and didn't record the problem in the maintenance logbook.
Da objasnim. Kada saznate, mozda vas prodje zelja za letenjem
Svaki avion ima tehnicku knjigu vazduhoplova i jedan je od obaveznih dokumenata za let. U njoj moze da se prati koje su tehnicke primedbe imale posade u prethodnim letovima, i sta su mehanicari uradili po tom pitanju.
Ovo je tehnicka knjiga upravo Lion Air
Na levoj strani lista se posda upisuje primedbu/kvar, a na desnoj mehanicar upisuje izvrsene radove. Nakom upisane primedbe avion ne moze da poleti dok mehanicar ne otkloni kvar i upise u knjigu sta je radio, ili - dok ne proveri da li sa takvim kvarom moze da se nastavi let i koliko dana avion moze da leti u takvom stanju.
Kod low cost avioprevoznika (uglavnom), na pilote se vrsi pritisak da ne upisuju primedbe jer je to veliki novcani gubitak za vlasnika. Zvanicno, svaki kvar mora da bude upisan. Nezvanicno, neko iz menadzmenta prijateljski upozorava kapetana da to ne cini. Upisana primedba zahtevace radove na avionu sto ce u najboljem slucaju izazvati visecasovno kasnjenje, a u najgorem slucaju avion ce danima biti prizemljen dok se ne nabavi nedostajuci deo (ne cuva se sve u hangaru, nego se kupuje po potrebi) ili dok se ne urade potrebni radovi.
U koliko kapetan upise primedbu, to je problem za njega koji znaci ili trenutni otkaz, ili mu se nece produziti ugovor koji je najcesce na godinu dana.
Iz tog razloga, posade pristaju da lete sa pokvarenim avionom (i nedeljama se leti tako), a primedba se ne upisuje vec se samo usmeno obavestava mehanicar nakon sletanja, a da li ce on nesto raditi ili nece, to samo zavisi od njega.... Na taj nacin, ni posada koja je preuzela avion od prethodne ne zna da li se nesto desilo sa nekim od avionskih sistema i da li je bilo sta (i sta) preduzeto po tom pitanju.
Off-Duty Pilot Saved Doomed 737 Max on Its Next-to-Last Flight
Wednesday, March 20, 2019 05:48 AM
By Alan Levin and Harry Suhartono
Jumpseat rider played critical role in Indonesian cockpit
Pilot actions show multiple errors required to crash 737 Max
(Bloomberg) --As the Lion Air crew fought to control their diving Boeing Co. 737 Max 8, they got help from an unexpected source: an off-duty pilot who happened to be riding in the cockpit.
That extra pilot, who was seated in the cockpit jumpseat, correctly diagnosed the problem and told the crew how to disable a malfunctioning flight-control system and save the plane, according to two people familiar with Indonesia’s investigation.
The next day, under command of a different crew facing what investigators said was an identical malfunction, the jetliner crashed into the Java Sea killing all 189 aboard.
The previously undisclosed detail on the earlier Lion Air flight represents a new clue in the mystery of how some 737 Max pilots faced with the malfunction have been able to avert disaster while the others lost control of their planes and crashed. The presence of a third pilot in the cockpit wasn’t contained in Indonesia’s National Transportation Safety Committee’s Nov. 28 report on the crash and hasn’t previously been reported.
The so-called dead-head pilot on the earlier flight from Bali to Jakarta told the crew to cut power to the motor driving the nose down, according to the people familiar, part of a checklist that all pilots are required to memorize.
“All the data and information that we have on the flight and the aircraft have been submitted to the Indonesian NTSC. We can’t provide additional comment at this stage due the ongoing investigation on the accident,” Lion Air spokesman Danang Prihantoro said by phone.
The Indonesia safety committee report said the plane had had multiple failures on previous flights and hadn’t been properly repaired.
Representatives for Boeing and the Indonesian safety committee declined to comment on the earlier flight.
The safety system, designed to keep planes from climbing too steeply and stalling, has come under scrutiny by investigators of the crash as well as a subsequent one less than five months later in Ethiopia. A malfunctioning sensor is believed to have tricked the Lion Air plane’s computers into thinking it needed to automatically bring the nose down to avoid a stall
Ako se nesto radi na svoju ruku u kokpitu to se zove troubleshooting, i ako se ideja posade zavrsi lose - nahebali su.
Za svaki kvar se postupa po check listi koja nalaze sta raditi u slucaju takvog kvara.
Mozda vam je moje pisanije u tri dela bilo suvoparno, i niste hteli da se smarate, pa cu se truditi da idem u sustinu.
Pokvareni AoA senzor je davao pogresan podatak o brzini na levoj i desnoj strani instrumenata (ispred kapetana i kopilota), po jednom podatku upadali su u stalling (gubitak uzgona) usled pada brzine, a u sustini su bili OK. I MCAS je odradio po istom - pogresnom podatku.
Kada se brzine razlikuju, radi se "AIRSPEED UNRELIABLE" check lista gde se nige ne pominje da se STABILIZER CUT OUT prekidaci postavljaju u polozaj OFF.
U to vreme, Boeing jos nije publikovao bilten kako reagovati na ovaj problem, kako ga prepoznati, i sta raditi.
Prema tome, ovaj sa treceg sedista predlaze troubleshooting, a posada treba da prepozna da li ima AIRSPEED UNRELIABLE ili RUNAWAY STABILIZER i da preduzme ispravnu akciju na osnovu (netacnih podataka i indikacija) koje ima.
1.jpg (42.58 KiB) Pogledano 2514 puta
BTW, letim 737 trideset godina i nikada nisam ni video, ni procitao, kako se prepoznaje pokvareni AoA - sto Boeing opisuje prvi put u biletnu nakon pada Lion Air-a. Da su nekada mogli da procitaju kako da prepoznaju kvar, pa da im se i zameri sto nisu izabrali pravu check listu.
Zapadni mediji na mnogo ruzne nacine uporno pokusavaju da svale krivicu na pilote obe kompanije.
Samo mala digresija, koja ima i nema veze sa ovim tragedijama, a ima veze sa poslednjom recenicom. Ovaj ludak i ego manijak sa prethodne stranice sto napravi aeromiting u Cirihu, odleteo je sve na ruke. Najvise pljuvanja zapadne strucne javnosti doslo je zbog toga sto nije koristio autopilot. Sada, ista ta javnost, posadama u gorepomenutim nesrecama zamera nedostatak rutine manuelnog letenja. Aj' se vi lepo odlucite, 'ocu kakim - necu kakim
Inače, za vreme Hladnog rata je ceo vazdušni prostor SSSR bio zatvoren za strane prelete, sa izuzetkom letova sa ili do aerodroma Moskva Šeremetjevo. Zamisli koliko se tada kružilo bez potrebe. Npr. od Pariza do Seula se letelo preko Grenlanda i Aljaske, kao što se vidi npr. po letu KAL 902 koji je greškom u jednom trenutku okrenuo za skoro 180 stepeni, pa završio iznad SSSR-a, gde ga je presreo Su-15 i ispalio jednu R-60 raketu, pa je oštećeni B707 sleteo na zamrznuto jezero.
Zanimljivo je bilo sa tim starim avionima bez inercijalnog navigacionog sistema... Ne pratiš kretanje sunca, kompas poludi (blizu polova) i za čas se izgubiš.
"It Was Go, Go, Go": Boeing Rushed 737 MAX Design In Race With Airbus
A major decision that Boeing made almost a decade ago has resulted in the greatest threat to the aerospace giant's reputation and the bottom line at the company after two major plane crashes in just under six months.
Back in 2011, American Airlines, who was an exclusive Boeing customer for more than 10 years, was getting ready to defect from the company in favor of purchasing hundreds of new jets from Airbus, according to The New York Times. Airbus had been stealing market share from Boeing for several years, and losing American Airlines would have been a crushing blow, costing billions of dollars in lost sales and thousands of jobs.
So when the CEO of American Airlines called Boeing to let them know a deal with Airbus was close, Boeing scrapped its plans of developing a new passenger plane and decided to instead hastily update its workhorse 737, promising the plane would be done in six years.
The 737 Max was born roughly three months later.
Mike Renzelmann, an engineer who retired in 2016 from Boeing’s flight control team on the 737 Max told the New York Times: “They weren’t going to stand by and let Airbus steal market share.”
Now, in the aftermath of two 737 MAX disasters which many have attributed to structural flaws on the airliner, people are wondering whether the pressure to build the jet so quickly may have led to the design and certification of the aircraft being carelessly rushed, with Boeing potentially missing crucial risks and underplaying the need for pilot training.
After the two most recent 737 Max crashes, a newly installed piece of software designed to avoid stalls has come into focus. The software was originally meant for larger, more fuel-efficient engines and was intended for an earlier version of the 737.
Current and former employees told the New York Times that the pace of work on the 737 Max was "frenetic". Engineers were "pushed to submit technical drawings and designs at roughly double the normal pace" according to the article. The project was also faced with tight deadlines and strict budgets, causing managers to shift workers between departments.
Six months after the launch of the 737 Max project, engineers already had preliminary designs for the Max - a fast turnaround, according to one Boeing engineer who worked on the project.
“The timeline was extremely compressed,” the engineer told the New York Times. “It was go, go, go.”
A technician who worked on wiring the 737 Max said that at the start of the project, "rushed designers were delivering sloppy blueprints" to him. His designs, to this day, still include omissions.
His internal assembly designs for the Max, he said, still include omissions today, like not specifying which tools to use to install a certain wire, a situation that could lead to a faulty connection. Normally such blueprints include intricate instructions.
Despite the intense atmosphere, current and former employees said, they felt during the project that Boeing’s internal quality checks ensured the aircraft was safe.
Rick Ludtke, an engineer who helped design the 737 Max cockpit and spent 19 years at Boeing, said that the company was purposely limiting design changes to prevent pilots from spending time training in flight simulators.
He said: “Any designs we created could not drive any new training that required a simulator. That was a first.”
Ludtke continued: "This program was a much more intense pressure cooker than I’ve ever been in. The company was trying to avoid costs and trying to contain the level of change. They wanted the minimum change to simplify the training differences, minimum change to reduce costs, and to get it done quickly."
Despite the rush, current and former employees said that they finished feeling confident in the safety of the plane.
Prior to 2011, Boeing had written off Airbus as a competitor to some degree. John Leahy, former Airbus COO said of the time: “Boeing thought we were a flash in the pan. But I thought there was no reason we couldn’t have 50 percent of the market.”
Scott Hamilton, managing director of the Leeham Company, an aviation consulting firm said: “Boeing was just completely arrogant in dismissing the viability of the A320.”
In retrospect was the decision to rush the 737 MAX production worth it? It's a toss up: Boeing did not lose the entire American order, but it did not lose it either: American Airlines decided to make deals with both Boeing and Airbus, buying hundreds of jets from each. Mr. Arpey called Mr. McNerney again, this time reading from a script to carefully calibrate his words. First, he congratulated the Boeing chief on the deal, according to the person with knowledge of the discussions. Then he broke the news that American would also place an order with Airbus.
In a statement, Boeing said: “The Max program launched in 2011. It was offered to customers in September 2012. Firm configuration of the airplane was achieved in July 2013. The first completed 737 Max 8 rolled out of the Renton factory in November 2015.”
The company added, “A multiyear process could hardly be considered rushed.” Several hundred dead people may beg to differ.
Meanwhile, in Renton, Wash., where the 737 Max is produced in a 1.1-million-square-foot plant, the mere possibility that Boeing engineering contributed to the crashes has cast a pall over the factory. After the Lion Air crash, Boeing offered trauma counseling to engineers who had worked on the plane.
“People in my group are devastated by this,” said Mr. Renzelmann, the former Boeing technical engineer. “It’s a heavy burden.”
Boeing is working on an update to MCAS software. The company was meeting with carriers over the weekend to discuss the update, which is expected to roll out by April. It also intends to make a previously optional safety indicator in its cockpit standard in new Max jets.
The business is increasingly under pressure as airlines reconsider their orders and ask for compensation. For now work in Renton is continuing apace, with Boeing making a record 52 737s a month — most of them Maxes — and aims to reach 57 by April; however should several more order clients follow in Indonesia's footsteps, and one of the biggest single contributors to US GDP will suddenly finds itself scrambling to recover reputation - and lost orders - that may never again be restored, all in the name of growing the bottom line.
Siguran sam da je dobar deo teksta tacan, jer avion upravo tako i izgleda.
Sminka koja je tu da parira Erbasu.
Mi, kao piloti, smo pitali da li cemo negde ici na simulator. Receno je da je neizvodljivo jer su u to vreme postojala samo tri simulatora i sve to van Evrope.
Nije bitno, u prvo vreme, bice nekoliko uvodnih letova sa instruktorom (koji o avionu zna koliko i ja, iz knjige).
Na kraju smo isli i bez instruktora.
Udjes, vidis gde je sta, i teraj Misko....
Air Serbia will add extra capacity to its fleet this coming summer season by wet-leasing a Bombardier CRJ900 aircraft from Estonia's Nordica. The 88-seat jet will join the Serbian carrier's fleet from June 1, enabling it to introduce nine new routes. The lease contract was concluded between Regional Jet, a joint venture between Nordica and LOT Polish Airlines, and Air Serbia for a four-month period. As a result, both aircraft and crew will be provided to the Serbian airline until October. Nordica described the deal as "good and profitable", adding that the two carriers would explore expanding their future cooperation.
This will be the second time Air Serbia has wet-leased a CRJ900 aircraft. It previously used the jet for a three-month period during its last major network expansion, in the summer of 2016, when Adria Airways provided both its crew and equipment. However, Air Serbia utilised the jet free of charge, as Adria was repaying its old debt owed to JAT Yugoslav Airlines through the deal. The Serbian carrier previously said, "The Bombardier CRJ900 aircraft offers excellent performance and passenger comfort levels, and is a great match for network expansion". The incoming aircraft will not be painted in Air Serbia's livery, while the cabin crew on board will be Estonian, with exception to an Air Serbia guest ambassador.
Air Serbia is yet to schedule the CRJ900 within its network. During its last stint at utilising the jet three years ago, it was deployed on flights to Kiev, Hamburg and Sofia. The Serbian carrier is planning one of its busiest summers to date with the introduction of seven new year-round routes and two seasonal services, as well as an increase in frequencies on a number of destinations. Furthermore, the airline will operate close to 1.000 charters flights. In addition to the CRJ900, the carrier will maintain operations with eight Airbus A319, two A320, one A330, six ATR72 and three Boeing 737-300 aircraft. Earlier this year, the airline's part-owner Etihad Airways cancelled an order for ten A320neo jets which were destined for Air Serbia. Airbus returned the 23.5 million dollar deposit payment for the aircraft to the Serbian carrier in January.
Najgore je svađati se sa budalom. Prvo te spusti na svoj nivo, a onda te dotuče iskustvom...
Citam komentare na exyuaviation, pa ne mogu da verujem kako svi misle da je to tako jednostavno. Hajde u redu za ovaj CRJ - dolazi kao wet lease (sa posadama, najskuplja moguca varijanta najma), ali sta cemo sa time da postojecu flotu nema ko da leti?
U narednom periodu, najavljen je odlazak 35 kapetana, a sa sadasnjim platama od oko 500.000 din, i sa ovakvim stanjem na trzistu pilota, niko pri zdravoj pameti ne zeli da dodje u Srbiju, a svi bi da pobegnu.
