Zalepile se gume za pistu na minus 52.
Tapatalk
Vazduhoplovi
Re: Vazduhoplovi
Nisu gume, vec kocnice zapeklem, kao i sam trap pa nije mogao se pomeri.
Vrsta podmazivanja samog trapa nije bila adekvatna za te temperature.
Komentar jednog rusa sa snimka: "Pravi muskarci sade drvo, grade kuce i guraju avione".
Ludi rusi
A ako volite da sedite pored prozora... razmislite:
Vrsta podmazivanja samog trapa nije bila adekvatna za te temperature.
Komentar jednog rusa sa snimka: "Pravi muskarci sade drvo, grade kuce i guraju avione".
Ludi rusi
A ako volite da sedite pored prozora... razmislite:
"This is Chief Inspector Clouseau’s residence. This is Chief Inspector Clouseau speaking on the pheun.”
Re: Vazduhoplovi
Najbolji 727 ikad
"This is Chief Inspector Clouseau’s residence. This is Chief Inspector Clouseau speaking on the pheun.”
Re: Vazduhoplovi
Ne postoji kontakt izmedju kontrola letenja Nikozija i Erdzan pa sami piloti moraju da koordiniraju izmedju njih, i tako je zadnjih cetvrt' veka.
Procedure su publikovane, ali svaki dan se nadje neko ko nije procitao sta treba da radi, pa sam sinoc slusao:
"Neidentifikovani avion iznad tacke TOMBI, odmah zovite kontrolu Erdzan ili skrenite u levo 90 stepeni, inace ce turske vazdusne snage reagovati"
Nije prijatno za cuti. Dalje se niko nije oglasavao na emergency frekvenciji mada su svi pazljivo slusali kako ce majstor da zapomaze kad ugleda F16 pored sebe
Posle sletanja iz Kuvajta, poslednji putnik se izuo i poceo da klanja na zaprepastenje posade, tim pre sto nije bilo vreme za namaz.
Sva posada i pun autobus putnika koji su vec napustili avion su cekali da on obavi to nesto svoje i sa svojom umotanom zenom izadje iz kabine.
Dakle, svakakvih budala ima na svim stranama...
Procedure su publikovane, ali svaki dan se nadje neko ko nije procitao sta treba da radi, pa sam sinoc slusao:
"Neidentifikovani avion iznad tacke TOMBI, odmah zovite kontrolu Erdzan ili skrenite u levo 90 stepeni, inace ce turske vazdusne snage reagovati"
Nije prijatno za cuti. Dalje se niko nije oglasavao na emergency frekvenciji mada su svi pazljivo slusali kako ce majstor da zapomaze kad ugleda F16 pored sebe
Posle sletanja iz Kuvajta, poslednji putnik se izuo i poceo da klanja na zaprepastenje posade, tim pre sto nije bilo vreme za namaz.
Sva posada i pun autobus putnika koji su vec napustili avion su cekali da on obavi to nesto svoje i sa svojom umotanom zenom izadje iz kabine.
Dakle, svakakvih budala ima na svim stranama...
Re: Vazduhoplovi
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iO4CSnFFgm4
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eCKhjs_xTvQ
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G4VIwX8_CDk
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eCKhjs_xTvQ
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G4VIwX8_CDk
Re: Vazduhoplovi
Kako ucitelj dozvoli?
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BAJKER
- Postovi: 6086
- Pridružio se: 13 Jan 2012, 15:34
- Garaža: Suzuki SX4 1.5 MTB Cannondale bike
- Lokacija: Zemun,Beograd,SRBIJA.
Re: Vazduhoplovi
Ovo je Mexicke policije, Ameri su mislim koristili DC 9-30 za slicne potrebe.cozmo napisao:Najbolji 727 ikad
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Kuzmanovic
- Postovi: 15308
- Pridružio se: 13 Jan 2012, 01:31
Re: Vazduhoplovi
Inex-Adria Aviopromet Flight 1308 was a McDonnell Douglas MD-81 aircraft operating a Yugoslavian charter flight to the French island of Corsica before commanding long haul flight to Mexico City. On December 1, 1981, the flight crashed on Corsica's Mont San-Pietro, killing all 180 people on board. The crash was the deadliest and first major aviation accident involving a McDonnell Douglas MD-80, as well as the second-deadliest air disaster in France behind Turkish Airlines Flight 981.
The subsequent investigation into the disaster revealed that control mistakenly believed that Flight 1308 was out of holding pattern, believing the aircraft was already located over sea, while in reality it was located some 15 km (9 mi) inland, over mountainous terrain of Corsica. The crew, apparently surprised at the instruction to descend, repeated several times that they were still in the holding pattern, which the control acknowledged. The crew was unfamiliar with the airport and its vicinity, as this was the first flight of Inex-Adria Aviopromet to the island of Corsica. The investigation determined that the imprecise language used by the crew of the MD-81 and the air traffic controller played a significant role in the accident. Air traffic control in Ajaccio was cleared of all charges. The air traffic controller in charge of Flight 1308 was transferred to another airport in France.
At the time of the accident, the Ajaccio airport had no radar. As a direct result of the accident, the equipment was upgraded and the approach pattern changed.
The subsequent investigation into the disaster revealed that control mistakenly believed that Flight 1308 was out of holding pattern, believing the aircraft was already located over sea, while in reality it was located some 15 km (9 mi) inland, over mountainous terrain of Corsica. The crew, apparently surprised at the instruction to descend, repeated several times that they were still in the holding pattern, which the control acknowledged. The crew was unfamiliar with the airport and its vicinity, as this was the first flight of Inex-Adria Aviopromet to the island of Corsica. The investigation determined that the imprecise language used by the crew of the MD-81 and the air traffic controller played a significant role in the accident. Air traffic control in Ajaccio was cleared of all charges. The air traffic controller in charge of Flight 1308 was transferred to another airport in France.
At the time of the accident, the Ajaccio airport had no radar. As a direct result of the accident, the equipment was upgraded and the approach pattern changed.
"This is Chief Inspector Clouseau’s residence. This is Chief Inspector Clouseau speaking on the pheun.”
Re: Vazduhoplovi
Cozmo, aj napisi ovo na srpskom i objasni o cemu se radi.
Ljudi ne ne razumeju sta pises i ako cesto postujes zanimljive stvari.
Kako se Adrija slupala je izuzetno interesantno a ovo je samo uopsteno, a cak ni to nije razumljivo obicnom citaocu.
Ljudi ne ne razumeju sta pises i ako cesto postujes zanimljive stvari.
Kako se Adrija slupala je izuzetno interesantno a ovo je samo uopsteno, a cak ni to nije razumljivo obicnom citaocu.
Re: Vazduhoplovi
Zanimljivo i tužno u isto vreme.
Na osnovu čega je kontrola locirala avion u nedostatku radara?
Na osnovu čega je kontrola locirala avion u nedostatku radara?
Re: Vazduhoplovi
Na osnovu komunikacije sa posadom i dolaznom procedurom.
Medjutim, ovde je bilo nesporazuma, odnosno do nesrece je doslo zbog neprecizne komunikacije izmedju posade i kontrolora i zbog nepostovanja procedure od strane posade.
Kontrolor letenja je mislio da je avion izasao iz holdinga (kruga cekanja za prilaz) i da je vec iznad mora i da ide u direktni prilaz (odakle se vrsio finalni prilaz na aerodrom u Ajaciu) i rekao je pilotu da snizava na visinu za finalni prilaz na pistu. Medjutim, avion je bio u krugu cekanja iznad brda (tako je bilo tad definisano) da bi snizavao visinu postepeno za prilaz, ali je posada snizila ispod minimalne dozvoljene visine, na 6000 fita (dozvoljena minimalna visina je bila 6800 fita). Takodje nisu dobro obratili paznju na proceduru prilazenja (hteli su da idu ispod oblaka), bili su prebrzi za krug cekanja radi snizavanja te ga nisu odradili dobro i nasli su se mnogo dalje od lokacije kruga cekanja, a jos jedan faktor je bila i opustena atmosfera u kokpitu i prisustvo kopilotovog sina prilikom slozene procedure sletanja (kao i nekih drugih lica).
"At 08:49 the crew reported over the AJO VOR. The controller cleared the flight to descend to 3300 feet on the 247 radial of the AJO VOR.
(Kontrolor je dao instrukciju posadi da se jave iznad VOR uredjaja Ajacio odakle se krece prema finalnom prilazu)
Three minutes later the flight radioed: "Rolling inbound out of six thousand". By that time the airplane had descended below the minimum holding altitude of 6800 feet for that area. He then reported: "Turning inbound to Ajaccio because at the moment we are in cloud." The controller then replied: "Roger, 1308, report Charlie Tango on final, surface wind two eight zero degrees, twenty knots."
(Tri minuta kasnije posada je javila da dolaze i da su na visini od 6000 fita iako je minimalna visina u krugu cekanja bila 6800 i da skrecu direktno ka Ajaciu jer su u oblacima. Kontrolor odgovara da se jave sa tacke radio fara Carli Tango na finalnom prilazu)
There was no response from flight 1308.
(Gubi se kontakt sa avionom)
Flight 1308 was flying a holding pattern to lose altitude, but the controller believed the aircraft was going to make a direct descent to begin the final approach. Hence the reference to the Charlie Tango (CT) NDB beacon.
(Kontrolor je po nepreciznom javljanju posade "Turning inbound to Ajjacio" mislio da idu direktno na snizavanje i finalni prilaz - a u stvarnosti je avion bio u krugu cekanja).
After several aural GPWS warnings (starting 13 seconds before impact) the crew increased engine thrust relatively slowly and pulled up too late. The left wing contact the top of Mont San-Pietro. Control was lost and the airplane crashed in mountainous terrain."
(13 sekundi pre udara cuju se upozorenja GPWS sistema - koji upozorava na opasnu blizinu terena - ali je posada sporo reagovala i bilo je kasno).
CAUSES (translated from original French language report) - UZROCI nesrece (iz originalnog izvestaja)
1. The Committee considers that the cause of this accident was that the descent undertaken by the crew led the aircraft to find itself in clouds below the instruments safety altitude for that part of the flight path.
(Komitet smatra da je uzrok ove nesreće bilo snizavanje preduzeto od strane posad da se nađu ispod oblaka a ispod minimalne nadmorske visine za taj deo putanje leta)
2. The Committee noted that when the crew, alerted by the GPWS, tried to regain altitude, the maneuver proved to be insufficient to overcome the effect of strong descending air currents due to relief and strong wind, present in the area where the aircraft was flying at that time.
(Odbor je konstatovao da je posada , posle upozorenja GPWS-a , pokušala da povrati visinu ali se manevar pokazao kao nedovoljan da prevaziđe efekat jakih nisponih vazdušnih strujanja zbog reljefa i jakog vetra, koji su bili prisutni u području gdje je avion leteo.)
OTHER FACTORS - OSTALI FAKTORI (koji su doprineli nesreci)
The Commission further noted that the combination of the following factors contributed to the crew being put in a situation it could not overcome:
The committee felt that the crew did not show the necessary rigor when preparing its approach.
It does not appear that a logical order has guided the crew in the revision and memorization of various parameters, including the safe altitude and the maximum speed of the holding circuit, which in any case, did not catch the attention of the crew in an appropriate manner.
In addition, the presence of a young child on the observer seat cockpit, until the end of the flight was a dispersion factor of attention;
(Odbor smatra da posada nije pokazala potrebnu ozbiljnost prilikom pripreme prilaza. Posada nije imala logican sled u pracenju različitih parametara leta i procedura, uključujući bezbednu visiniu i maksimalnu brzinu koja je propisana. Pored toga , prisustvo malog deteta na posmatračkom sedištua kokpita je dovelo do osipanja paznje u kokpitu)
The misunderstandings which have developed in the exchange of messages between the captain and the approach controller could disrupt, at certain times, the working conditions of the crew. The controller consequently did not have an accurate representation of the progress of the aircraft in the performance of its procedure and, therefore, did not intervene when two messages "call you inbound on radial two forty seven", and then "rolling inbound out of six thousand" would have told him, if he had better interpreted them, an ambiguous situation for the first and abnormal and dangerous for the second;
(Nesporazumi kojih je bilo u razmeni poruka između kapetana i pristup kontrolora mogli su poremetiti, u određenim periodima, uslove rada posade . Kontrolor stoga nije imao tačan prikaz napretka vazduhoplova u obavljanju prilaza i , zbog toga sto nije znao tacnu lokaciju aviona nije reagovao na poruke posade "da idu na direktan prilaz" i "da snizavaju ispod 6000 fita jer da je znao tacnu poziciju aviona odmah bi ih ispravio jer je znao da je na tom mestu minimalna visina 6800 i da se odatle ne ide direktno ka VOR-u odakle se ide u finalni prilaz.
Airspeed of the aircraft was greater than the maximum speed of the holding pattern and crew did not adopt the correction factors adapted to altitude wind they had encountered during the previous segment th flight. This led to the airplane overfly an area where, although it is included in the protected area of the holding pattern, the upper air movements were particularly important;
(Brzina aviona je bila veca od maksimalne dozvoljene za krug cekanja i posada nije korigovala istu prema brzini vetra na datoj visini. Avion je preleteo podrucje gde se radi krug cekanja i uspone vazdusne struje su ih dodatno pomerile jos dalje. Da su unete sve korekcije avion bi bio na odredjenoj lokaciji.)
The symbolic representation of the holding pattern on the approach chart used by the crew corresponds to a path, with no wind, and an aircraft which would have approximately 150 knots indicated airspeed. It calls not evident attention to Airmen on the actual dimensions of the actually travelled circuits in flight, nor therefore on altitude over the terrain reliefs.
(Na prilaznoj karti je dat krug cekanja koji se obavlja u uslovima bez vetra i sa definisanom brzinom od 150 cvorova, a takodje ni sama reprezentacija terena nije bila dobra).
Medjutim, ovde je bilo nesporazuma, odnosno do nesrece je doslo zbog neprecizne komunikacije izmedju posade i kontrolora i zbog nepostovanja procedure od strane posade.
Kontrolor letenja je mislio da je avion izasao iz holdinga (kruga cekanja za prilaz) i da je vec iznad mora i da ide u direktni prilaz (odakle se vrsio finalni prilaz na aerodrom u Ajaciu) i rekao je pilotu da snizava na visinu za finalni prilaz na pistu. Medjutim, avion je bio u krugu cekanja iznad brda (tako je bilo tad definisano) da bi snizavao visinu postepeno za prilaz, ali je posada snizila ispod minimalne dozvoljene visine, na 6000 fita (dozvoljena minimalna visina je bila 6800 fita). Takodje nisu dobro obratili paznju na proceduru prilazenja (hteli su da idu ispod oblaka), bili su prebrzi za krug cekanja radi snizavanja te ga nisu odradili dobro i nasli su se mnogo dalje od lokacije kruga cekanja, a jos jedan faktor je bila i opustena atmosfera u kokpitu i prisustvo kopilotovog sina prilikom slozene procedure sletanja (kao i nekih drugih lica).
"At 08:49 the crew reported over the AJO VOR. The controller cleared the flight to descend to 3300 feet on the 247 radial of the AJO VOR.
(Kontrolor je dao instrukciju posadi da se jave iznad VOR uredjaja Ajacio odakle se krece prema finalnom prilazu)
Three minutes later the flight radioed: "Rolling inbound out of six thousand". By that time the airplane had descended below the minimum holding altitude of 6800 feet for that area. He then reported: "Turning inbound to Ajaccio because at the moment we are in cloud." The controller then replied: "Roger, 1308, report Charlie Tango on final, surface wind two eight zero degrees, twenty knots."
(Tri minuta kasnije posada je javila da dolaze i da su na visini od 6000 fita iako je minimalna visina u krugu cekanja bila 6800 i da skrecu direktno ka Ajaciu jer su u oblacima. Kontrolor odgovara da se jave sa tacke radio fara Carli Tango na finalnom prilazu)
There was no response from flight 1308.
(Gubi se kontakt sa avionom)
Flight 1308 was flying a holding pattern to lose altitude, but the controller believed the aircraft was going to make a direct descent to begin the final approach. Hence the reference to the Charlie Tango (CT) NDB beacon.
(Kontrolor je po nepreciznom javljanju posade "Turning inbound to Ajjacio" mislio da idu direktno na snizavanje i finalni prilaz - a u stvarnosti je avion bio u krugu cekanja).
After several aural GPWS warnings (starting 13 seconds before impact) the crew increased engine thrust relatively slowly and pulled up too late. The left wing contact the top of Mont San-Pietro. Control was lost and the airplane crashed in mountainous terrain."
(13 sekundi pre udara cuju se upozorenja GPWS sistema - koji upozorava na opasnu blizinu terena - ali je posada sporo reagovala i bilo je kasno).
CAUSES (translated from original French language report) - UZROCI nesrece (iz originalnog izvestaja)
1. The Committee considers that the cause of this accident was that the descent undertaken by the crew led the aircraft to find itself in clouds below the instruments safety altitude for that part of the flight path.
(Komitet smatra da je uzrok ove nesreće bilo snizavanje preduzeto od strane posad da se nađu ispod oblaka a ispod minimalne nadmorske visine za taj deo putanje leta)
2. The Committee noted that when the crew, alerted by the GPWS, tried to regain altitude, the maneuver proved to be insufficient to overcome the effect of strong descending air currents due to relief and strong wind, present in the area where the aircraft was flying at that time.
(Odbor je konstatovao da je posada , posle upozorenja GPWS-a , pokušala da povrati visinu ali se manevar pokazao kao nedovoljan da prevaziđe efekat jakih nisponih vazdušnih strujanja zbog reljefa i jakog vetra, koji su bili prisutni u području gdje je avion leteo.)
OTHER FACTORS - OSTALI FAKTORI (koji su doprineli nesreci)
The Commission further noted that the combination of the following factors contributed to the crew being put in a situation it could not overcome:
The committee felt that the crew did not show the necessary rigor when preparing its approach.
It does not appear that a logical order has guided the crew in the revision and memorization of various parameters, including the safe altitude and the maximum speed of the holding circuit, which in any case, did not catch the attention of the crew in an appropriate manner.
In addition, the presence of a young child on the observer seat cockpit, until the end of the flight was a dispersion factor of attention;
(Odbor smatra da posada nije pokazala potrebnu ozbiljnost prilikom pripreme prilaza. Posada nije imala logican sled u pracenju različitih parametara leta i procedura, uključujući bezbednu visiniu i maksimalnu brzinu koja je propisana. Pored toga , prisustvo malog deteta na posmatračkom sedištua kokpita je dovelo do osipanja paznje u kokpitu)
The misunderstandings which have developed in the exchange of messages between the captain and the approach controller could disrupt, at certain times, the working conditions of the crew. The controller consequently did not have an accurate representation of the progress of the aircraft in the performance of its procedure and, therefore, did not intervene when two messages "call you inbound on radial two forty seven", and then "rolling inbound out of six thousand" would have told him, if he had better interpreted them, an ambiguous situation for the first and abnormal and dangerous for the second;
(Nesporazumi kojih je bilo u razmeni poruka između kapetana i pristup kontrolora mogli su poremetiti, u određenim periodima, uslove rada posade . Kontrolor stoga nije imao tačan prikaz napretka vazduhoplova u obavljanju prilaza i , zbog toga sto nije znao tacnu lokaciju aviona nije reagovao na poruke posade "da idu na direktan prilaz" i "da snizavaju ispod 6000 fita jer da je znao tacnu poziciju aviona odmah bi ih ispravio jer je znao da je na tom mestu minimalna visina 6800 i da se odatle ne ide direktno ka VOR-u odakle se ide u finalni prilaz.
Airspeed of the aircraft was greater than the maximum speed of the holding pattern and crew did not adopt the correction factors adapted to altitude wind they had encountered during the previous segment th flight. This led to the airplane overfly an area where, although it is included in the protected area of the holding pattern, the upper air movements were particularly important;
(Brzina aviona je bila veca od maksimalne dozvoljene za krug cekanja i posada nije korigovala istu prema brzini vetra na datoj visini. Avion je preleteo podrucje gde se radi krug cekanja i uspone vazdusne struje su ih dodatno pomerile jos dalje. Da su unete sve korekcije avion bi bio na odredjenoj lokaciji.)
The symbolic representation of the holding pattern on the approach chart used by the crew corresponds to a path, with no wind, and an aircraft which would have approximately 150 knots indicated airspeed. It calls not evident attention to Airmen on the actual dimensions of the actually travelled circuits in flight, nor therefore on altitude over the terrain reliefs.
(Na prilaznoj karti je dat krug cekanja koji se obavlja u uslovima bez vetra i sa definisanom brzinom od 150 cvorova, a takodje ni sama reprezentacija terena nije bila dobra).
"This is Chief Inspector Clouseau’s residence. This is Chief Inspector Clouseau speaking on the pheun.”
Re: Vazduhoplovi
Hvala ti na opisu. Secam se da nam je Veres pricao, medjutim moralo je da se sedne nad kartu I razmisli sta su radili o cemu me u to vreme nesto I nije bilo puno briga.
Danas sam gledao procedure za AJA I sigurno su promenjene jer su holdinzi iznad mora a ne kretenski zamisljeno - iznad brda.
Glavna kvaka je gde su bili I kako su se tu u opste nasli, kao I u potpunom nerazumevanju pilota I k.l.
Puno vremena je izgubljeno jer je kontrolor poslao search and rescue misleci da su iznad mora a oni su opepelili brdo.
Koliko jecteren nepristupacan govori da su tek 2000 I neke slovenacki planinari I specijalci uklonili dvadesetak tona ostataka aviona pronasavsi tom prilikom I ostatke nekih putnika koji su kasnije identifikovani.
Danas sam gledao procedure za AJA I sigurno su promenjene jer su holdinzi iznad mora a ne kretenski zamisljeno - iznad brda.
Glavna kvaka je gde su bili I kako su se tu u opste nasli, kao I u potpunom nerazumevanju pilota I k.l.
Puno vremena je izgubljeno jer je kontrolor poslao search and rescue misleci da su iznad mora a oni su opepelili brdo.
Koliko jecteren nepristupacan govori da su tek 2000 I neke slovenacki planinari I specijalci uklonili dvadesetak tona ostataka aviona pronasavsi tom prilikom I ostatke nekih putnika koji su kasnije identifikovani.
Re: Vazduhoplovi
Da, holding su kasnije pomerili iznad mora i instalirali prilazni radar, a takodje i izmenili procedure. Kontrolor nije odgovarao.
2008. su slovenci izveli akciju uklanjanja ostatka olupine (koji je bio, prosto neverovatno, u odlicnom stanju) - a nazalost nadjeni su i ostaci putnika koji nisu bili uklonjeni prilikom istrage ili pronadjeni.
Ima nekih 16 ili 17 videozapisa sa asanacije 2008. godine:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WsEz7wWRHzo
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kgc2b5_jJlY
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jnJkqa4n3p8
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_-a2t_86Nl0
2008. su slovenci izveli akciju uklanjanja ostatka olupine (koji je bio, prosto neverovatno, u odlicnom stanju) - a nazalost nadjeni su i ostaci putnika koji nisu bili uklonjeni prilikom istrage ili pronadjeni.
Ima nekih 16 ili 17 videozapisa sa asanacije 2008. godine:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WsEz7wWRHzo
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kgc2b5_jJlY
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jnJkqa4n3p8
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_-a2t_86Nl0
"This is Chief Inspector Clouseau’s residence. This is Chief Inspector Clouseau speaking on the pheun.”
Re: Vazduhoplovi
Najgore je svađati se sa budalom. Prvo te spusti na svoj nivo, a onda te dotuče iskustvom...
